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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
Hll'HARD NOLAN JARDINE,

I
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,(

vs.
BRUNS\VICK CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

10631

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATE MENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE.
1

Plaintiff alleges he was damaged when he financed
the investor who was supposed to finance him in a bowling venture, plaintiff's expenditures allegedly resulting
from misrepresentation by defendant as to the investor's
ability.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court denied Brunswick's motion to dismiss at
the close of plaintiff's case and ultimately entered judgment for plaintiff for $28,714.34 and costs.

RELIEF, SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and dismissal of the action.

2

STATEMEN'r OFF ACTS
Since this court on appeal looks at the facts most
favorably to the respondent, we state the facts as they
appear from plaintiff's case in chief, ignoring the facts
developed by appellant in its defense. Such basis for
the statement of facts also clearly delineates appellant's
contention that Brunswick's motion to dismiss at the
close of plaintiff's case was well taken.
Jardine was a retired "self made" man. Although
he had had little formal schooling, he had been successful
in accumulating assets worth about a quarter of a million
dollars through various business ventures, including the
operation of a sawmill in which he had about 30 employees, trucking, farming and building and leasing business properties. (R. 120-124, 181-187) He became interested in becoming the operator of a bowling alley. Ida
Young, a lady who was a friend of plaintiff's, a bowler,
and a real estate saleslady suggested he talk with Brunswick, who sells bowling equipment. (R. 125) Costs of
equipment and building were discussed and it was decided that Jardine did not want to attempt to undertake
to finance the entire venture, but that Jardine would
buy the bowling equipment if an investor were found who
wanted to handle the financing of and construct the
building and lease it to Jardine. (R. 127, 189) Brunswick
said it thought financing was no problem, that there were
investors available who were interested in constructing
a building for lease to an operator. (R. 127) Brunswick
introduced a doctor to ,Jardine as one interested in mak-
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ing 8urh an investment, and Jardine went to a bowling
operntorn' 8chool given by Brunswick in Chicago. The
dortor however declined the proposition. (R. 131) Brunswick then introduced Jardine to Jack Charlesworth, as a
person who could build and finance the building. (R. 133)
Charlesworth was then working on a con8truction project,
constructing between 15 and 20 houses at Hill Field.
Charlesworth took Jardine, Jardine's son and Ida Young,
all of whom were interested in obtaining a bowling alley
to operate, and who later formed and owned Sunrise
Lane8, Inc., as the operating company (R. 202-204, 321),
on an inspection trip to take a look at his work at Hill
Field and it appeared therefrom as if "he would have
lJlenty of money, and plenty corning in." (R. 251) Charlesworth told them he expected an income from that project
in the range of $60,000 which he expected to put into
the bowling alley building. (R. 215, 251)
Charlesworth had also made arrangements with
third parties to build other buildings for other bowling
alley operators. (R. 252-255)
Jardine and Charlesworth, after considering a building site recommended by Brunswick, on which it held an
option (R. 128, 136), expanded their plans and decided
to acquire a large 181;2 ac.re tract on which J ardine'8
friend, Ida Young, would obtain a commission. (R. 137139, 245, 286) This was to be acquired as a site for a
shopping center complex. (R. 137) Brunswick thought
the part to be used for bowling lanes was suitable. (R.
245)
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Charlesworth thereupon formed a new corporation,
Compact Building Company, with Charlesworth as president. (Ex. P. 2, R. 3-19) It was intended that the new
corporation would purchase the site and construct tlw
building. (R. 13±, 135, L13) ·when, ho-wever, the initial
$500 down payment on a total purchast' price of $37 ,000
for the land could not be raised by Compact, the contemplated transaction was changed. ( R. 1±7, 215, Ex. P. G,
R. 3±9) Jardine contracted to buy the 18% acres himself,
taking a deed for 2 acres, valued at $±,000, on which the
bowling building was to be built, paying $9,000 of the
purchase price to the seller. (Ex. P. 6, R. 349, R. 147, 148,
247) Jardine then conveyed the 2 acres to Compact who
agreed to build, lease to Jardine and reimburse him for
the payment. (Ex. P. 8, R. 349, Ex. P. 9, R. 3±9)
When the Hill Field payments did not materialize as
anticipated, 'Compact did not have funds for construction
on the 2 acre site thus acquired and owned by it. (R. 218,
219, 259, 297) Charlesworth knew that Jardine had $23,000 cash which he was going to use as a down payment
on the equipment he was going to buy from Brunswick.
(R. 297) Charlesworth asked Jardine to advance $23,000
to Compact to be repaid in ample time for the purchase
of the bowling equipment. (R. 297) Brunswick wrote the
following letter to Jardine:
"At the request of 1\fr. Jack Charlesworth, I
am writing this note to inform you that it will be
satisfactory with us for you to pay the majority
of the balance due remaining of your down payment upon the arrival of the lanes. This amount
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will be a sight draft attached to a Shipper's Order
Bill of Lading." (.l!Jx. P. 10, R. 349)

\VlH·n asked for a "stronger" statement, Brunswick refus8ecl. (H. 299) This letter was delivered by Charlesworth to Jardine. (R. 299) \\Then asked by Jardine about
the transaction as proposed, Brunswick said it was all
right with Brunswick, but warned Jardine to "protect
yourself." (R. 157, 200) The $23,000 was advanced by
Jardine to Compact. According to J ardine's testimony,
Jardine advanced the $23,000 relying upon the fact that
Charlesworth told Jardine that Charlesworth was going
to get payments from the Hill Field job in order to pay
Jardine. Jardine further testified that the reason he
advanced the $23,000 was because Brunswick wrote the
above quoted letter, delaying the down payment. (R. 219)
Jardine took a promisso·ry note, executed by Compact
and Charlesworth, secured only by an assignment of the
proceeds of a life insurance policy in the event of Charlesworth's death. (R. 157, 200, 262) Construction was then
commenced.
When the moneys which were anticipated from the
Hill Field construction project were not forthcoming,
laborers and materialmen could not be paid. (R. 163)
No loan could then be obtained on the unfinished bowling
building project. (R. 266) Mechanics lien claimants
brought an action to foreclose their liens. Jardine and
Compact were parties to the foreclosure action in which
there were various claims, counterclaims and cross
claims. (Case No. 138888, R. 350) Compact deeded the
2 acre site back to Jardine. (Ex. 14, R. 349) Jardine,
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while represented by his comrnel in tlw foreclosure suit,
entered into a compromise settlement which released
Compact from any claim Jardine had arising out of thP
transaction. (R. 226)
Jardine paid $1,000 to Brurnnvick as a down payment
on the contract to buy equipment. He expended $175.00
for food and lodging while attending school in Chicago,
$169.10 for train fare, agreed to pay his sons $350.00 to
attend a bowling school in Los Angeles and paid Dodson
Welding $20.24 for work on the building. The fair market
value of the 2 acre tract was $4000. These items together
with the $23,000 loan totalled $28,714.34, the amount of
the judgment. (R. 167) The court found these expenditures were made in reliance upon Brunswick's representations as to Charlesworth's ability to build and finance a
biulding, which representations the court found to be
false, which Brunswick would have known to be false had
it made investigations.
Jardine had formed a eo·rporation, Sunrise Lanes,
Inc., as a prospective operator of the bowling lanes. (R.
202) This corporation had as principal stockholders and
officers, Jardine, his two adult sons, and his real estate
broker Ida Young with all of whom he consulted before
each of his ventures. (R. 203-206, 321) Although he used
his lawyer for the incorporation, he did not consult him
on any of the other transactions related herein, but,
instead, used his real estate saleslady, Ida Young, to
draft the documents involved including deeds, contracts,
agreements, notes and lease. (R. 139, 193, 208)
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'L1 h<• only n:idc•nl'.<' in plaintiff'::-; ca::-;e of representations c-orn·erning Charl(•s\rn·rth or Compact is the following:
(a) .J ardine's tPsti1110ny ielating to the introduction
of .Jardine to Charll·sworth hy Brunswick's Tracy, when
no loan was conternplatt·cl.
"A. Well, .Jark Charlesworth came in a little
hit latc'. \Ve were all in there when he came. When
he came in Harold Tracy got up and told me,
"rl1is \\'as Jack Charlesworth, President of Compact Building Company and that he could build
these buildings and finance them and there was
nothing to worry about.'" (R. 133)
(b) J ardine's testimony relating to a comment made
by Dinius of Brunswick when Charlesworth said,
"he had his money tied up, wasn't able to
gt>t this down payment for this ground at the
particular time and wondered if I (Jardine) would
advance the money for the ground. Carl Dinius
said, if this would hurry the thing and get it in
gear he thought it would be a good thing - - - - . If
we can get this thing started now we will have it
open for the leagues. If it drags on getting started
we could be in trouble for the fall leagues." (R.
147-148)
( c) J ardine's testimony relating to a comment made
by Dinius of Brunswick on Charlesworth's Hill Field job,
" - - - - that he felt like this draw would be
okay and he wouldn't have any problems, and
Dinius himself and Harold and everybody concerned \Vas anxious to get this thing going - - - - .
vV e had discussed several times - - - - as to the
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ability he had once he got the money from Hill
Field - - - - . The general statement \Y~S that wlwn
he got this mom•y that it could be n•ally roiling
and it seemed like we were all happy at this point''
(R. 233-235)
( d) Ida Young's testimony relating to a comment
made by Dinius of Brunswick,
"I remember distinctly Carl Dinius saying
that l\fr. Charlesworth, after he completes the
construction of this bowling alley, from then on
Brunswick themselves are going to finance him
on all the rest of the buildings for the Brunswick
equipment. Now, this is the statenwnt that was
made at the time. Not only that, another statement that I remember Harold Tracy making was
that Charlesworth would be a good man to build
the building bPcause he knew exactly how to c-Onstruct that building to house the Brunswick lanes."

(R. 252)
( e) Ida Young's testimony relating to comments
made by Dinius of Brunswick,
" - - - - That he thought that l\fr. Charlesworth
would be a good contractor for l\Ir. Jardine, that
he knew exactly how to build the building to house
the Brunswick lanes. He knew how to build the
building to Brunswick's specifications for their
lanes. l can't remember how it came up about
Mr. Charlesworth's project up close to Hill Field.
- - - - And I believe at that time that Mr. Charlesworth said he would like to take all of us up to see
the project up at Hill Field, and Mr. Dinius said
he thought that would be a good idea - - - - that
he had a nice setup." (R. 274)

9
Liahilitict:> of Charlc·t:>worth and Compact were shown
hy Plaintiff't:> 1£xhibit 1 (It. 049) but there was no evident:\~ rPlating to assets or m't worth of either, nor wat:>
thl· solvency of either one discussed. (R. 214)
rrhere was no evidence that payments were not
L·x1wcted from Hill Field by all concerned, nor does plaintiff's record show why UH· payments ultimately were not
received.

STATEl\lI£NT OF POINTS AND ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE
CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE SHOULD HA VE
BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONSTITUTING PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF DOES
NOT SHOW A CAUSE OF ACTION GENERALLY
AND IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS, IN
THAT SAID EVIDENCE FAILED TO SHOW:
(a)

A REPRESENTATION.

(b) ITS FALSITY.
(c)

ITS MATERIALITY.

(d) DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF
FALSITY OR IGNORANCE OF ITS TRUTH.

ITS

(e) DEFENDANT'S INTENT THAT ANY REPRESENTATION BE ACTED UPON BY PLAINTIFF
AND IN THE MANNER REASONABLY CONTEMPLATED.
(f)

PLAINTIFF'S IGNORANCE OF ITS F ALS-

(g)

PLAINTIFF'S

ITY.
TRUTH.

RELIANCE

UPON

ITS
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(h) PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO RELY THEREON.
(i) PLAINTIFF'S CONSEQUENT AND PROXIMATE INJURY.

The nine clements listed ahovP are requisite for
liability for misrepn'sentation. Stuck v. Delta Land &
Wa.ter Company, 63 U. 495, 227 P. 791, 795, cited with
approval in many Utah cases including Pace v. Parrish,
122 U. 141, 247 P. 2d 273.
(a)

REPRESENTATION.

Considering the introduction made by Brunswick of
Charlesworth to Jardine in light of the circumstances,
there was no "representation."
When the introduction was made, it was for the
purpose of getting together one ·who wanted to take the
financial risk of constructing and owning a building with
one who wanted to lease it on completion.
There was no thought in anyone's mind then that Jardine would advance risk capital. Therefore, when Brunswick said, by way of introduction, that Charlesworth was
a person "who could build the buildings and finance them"
this was neither intended as, nor would it reasonably have
been construed by Jardine as being, a representation as
to Charlesworth's credit. It was, rather, an expression
of opinion that the desired building could be acquired
through Charlesworth. There was no representation of
fact, rather a statement of opinion. In fact, Jardine
testified that the solvency of Charlesworth or Compact
was not discussed by Brunswick. (R. 214)
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Then• \Yas an expression of 01nnwn by Brunswick
hnt nu reprel:'.lcntation of fact. Charlesworth told Jardine
that the building would be built by getting a mortgage and
by using money he expected to receive.

"Q. You, in fact, had talked with Charlesworth right after you met Charlesworth about how
Charlesworth - or Compact Building would get
this building built, didn't you?
A. Yes, with Dinius. The three of us were
together.

And it was Charlesworth who told you
how he would do it, wasn't it~
Q.

A. Well, I think that he mentioned at the
time he would have to get a mortgage on this
ground plus money he already had coming he
could do the building.'' (R. 209)
Whether said mortgage could be obtained in the future,
and whether funds would be received in the future can be
the basis of speculation and opinion, but not the basis
for a representation of fact.
(b)

F ALSJiTY.

Plaintiff did not show that the statement, made on
introduction, that Charlesworth could "build the buildings and finance them," was then an untrue statement.
The statement did not relate to solvency, at least
in J ardine's mind, because Jardine stated that solvency
of Charlesworth or of Compact was not discussed. (R.
21-t) But if it be assumed that it did relate to solvency,
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there \\·as no evidencp relating to assets or net worth of
either Charlesworth or Compact.
The statement could have n•lat<•d to skill in constructing buildings. Assuming it did, there was no evidence that Charlesworth or Comvact was unskilled.
The stateuwnt probably related in part to the fact
that Charlesworth could obtain construction pen;onnel
and equipment and in part that he would be able to pay
for the construction as it progressed. Assuming it did,
as to the first part, there is no evidence as to Charlesworth's or Com1iact's personnel or equipment. As to the
second part, the evidence was that when the statement
was made, income was coming in from the Hill Field project ·which was going to be used for the construction,
but that subsequently conditions changed, income was not
received as expected, and once in the bind of having a
half completed building, interim financing could then not
be obtained. There was no evidence that Charlesworth
and everyone else concerned didn't anticipate that periodic payments totaling about $60,000 would be forthcoming from the Hill Field project which could be used for
the construction of the bowling building. The only evidence was to the contrary,that when the representation
was made these payments were expected. The statement,
therefore, was true when made.
Plaintiff attempted to show that the builder was not
licensed. At the time any statement regarding ability to,
build was made, the corporation 'vith whom plaintiff later
dealt was not yet in existence, and so could not have had
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a licen:-;e. Although a license had been issued to anoilier
business entity based on an examination taken and passed
by Charles\vorth (R. 285) the question of license, or lack
tlwreof, is not material because one constructing a building for himself is not a contractor, and needs no license.
58-23-2(5), UCA 1953. Such was the case here.
There was no evidence as to what investigation
Brunswick made or what was found on any such investi-gation.
(c)

MATERIALITY.

The statement that Charlesworth could build the
buildings and finance them relates to and is material
to the contemplated transaction in which Charlesworth
would build and lease to Jardine, but does not relate to
and is therefore not material to the subsequent reversed
transaction in which Jardine did the financing. Jardine
is not complaining about not getting a lease, but of losses
incurred on loans.

( d)

KNOWLJiJDGE.

There is no evidence concerning Brunswick's knowledge of Companct's solvency, skill, ability, credit or
income. Plaintiff, in presenting his case, had no Brunswick employee nor any other witness testify as to knowledge of Brunswick.
Compact expected money in the future which did
not materialize. Holding Brunswick liable necessitates
the conclusion that Brunswick should have realized iliat
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for some reason, not shown in plaintiff's eas<>, tht- fund:-;
would not eventually be forthcoming. There was no evidence as to what Brunswick knew or should have known
about the future income from Hill Field.
(e)

INTEN1-1 THAT Rli.:PRESENTATION BE
ACTED UPON IN MANNER REASONABLY
CONTEMPLATED.

One introducing a landlord to a prospective tenant
does not reasonably contemplate that the prospective
tenant will lend the funds for acquisition and construction without security.
Forseeability of damage is necessary.
"In order that such liability may exist, it is
necessary that ... the person giving the information should have, or be chargeable with, knowledge
that ... the person to whom it is given will be
likely to be injured in person or in property as
a result of acting thereon."
65 CJS Negligence, Par. 20.
See also, 37 CJS Fraud, Par. 141
Plaintiff must have relied on a representation in a
transaction intended by defendant.
"One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions is subject to
liability for harm caused to them by their reliance
upon the information if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating the
information which its recipient is justified in expecting, and
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( b) the harm is suffered
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance
upon it in a transaction in which it
was intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially therewith."
"h. TRANSACTIONS FOR GUIDANCE
IN WHICH THE INFORMATION IS SUPPLIED. As in the case of a maker of a fradulent
representation, the liability of one who negligently
supplies information for the guidance of another
is restricted to the loss suffered in the transaction
for guidance in which the information was furnished or in a transaction of the same type and of
substantially the same extent. Thus, accountants
who negligently make an audit of the books of the
A Corporation, which they are told is to be used
for the purpose of obtaining a particular line of
banking credit, are not subject to liability to a
wholesale merchant whom the corporation has
induced to supply it with goods on credit by showing him the certificate of the audit. On the other
hand, it is not necessary that the transaction in
which the negligent audit is relied upon should be
the very one to influence which the audit has been
made. It is enough that it is a transaction substantially identical therewith. Thus, in the situation above dealth with, if the corporation, finding
that at the moment it does not need the credit
to obtain which the audit was procured, subsequently uses it to obtain from the bank a later
credit, the accountants will be liable to the bank
for the loss resulting from its extension of the
credit unless the financial condition of the corporation has materially changed in the interim."
American Law Institute, Restatement of
Torts, Par. 552.
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When introducing a prospective landlord to a pro.
spective tenant, defendant would not reasonably have
contemplated that the transaction would change and that
instead of having a building built for him to occupy, the~
tenant would himself advance funds for the construction
of the building he was to occupy. Even if such a compleh•
s .vitch should have reasonably been contemplated, it
would be even more remote that plaintiff would have
reasonably contemplated that such financing would be
made without a credit check, an examination of financial
statements and without adequate security. The record
shows that after he decided to finance the construction,
plaintiff did none of these. (R. 208)
1

Not only did Brunswick not contemplate at the time
it made the introduction of the prospective landlord and
tenant that a statement then made would be relied upon
in a transaction whereby the tenant financed the construction, but when Brunswick heard that plaintiff was
later contemplating such a transaction, Brunswick expressly warned plaintiff to "protect yourself." (R. 157,
200) This shows that Brunswick had not previously
contemplated that a loan would be made.
Since no loan was contemplated at the time a statement was made, loss arising therefrom is not actionable.
(f)

IGNORANCE.

Plaintiff had many meetings with Charlesworth who
told plaintiff about his Hill Field job which later caused
financial problems on the bowling alley. Plaintiff even
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('ill tu 11 ill Fi<·ld with Charlet>worth and examined the
\\ ork and obt>c'l'VPd its status. (R. 210, 250)
11.

Charlet>\\'orth told plaintiff he was in financial diffirnlt)' lweansc~ hit> vaymcntt> on the Hill Field job were not
fortl1eoming. (R. 21G)
The very fact the builder didn't even have the down
paym('nt, much k•ss money even to start construction,
\rnuld gin~ any reasonable person knowledge of financial
difficulty.
( g)

RELIANCE.

Jardine consulted with Ida Young, the real tor who
drafted the various documents and who interested him
initially in the bowling alley project. (R. 199) He conwlted with his sons. (R. 206) He consulted with Charlesworth and checked on Charlesworth's work. (R. 250) He
ignored defendant's recommendation as to a building
t>ite. (R. 128, 136) All indicate lack of reliance.
But of more importance, Jardine's testimony regarding "reliance" in making the $32,000 loan, was that he
relied on two things, Charlcsworth's statement and
Brnnswick's letter. Jardine testified:

"Q. How did you know he had it coming?
A.

Just from what he told me.

Q.

~What

A.

He said he had this money coming from Hill

did he

say~
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Field.
Q. On this Hill Field project you had exarnim'd 1
A. Yes.
Q. 'Vhat did he say''? -When did he expect it?
A. I believe he told me he got paid on the 15th
of each month.
Q. How much money did he ::my he had coming 1
A. Golly, I don't remember for sure. But it
seemed to me $58 or $60,000.00 at this - I
can't say this for sure.
Q. It was in that range wasn't it?
A. Plenty sufficient to take care of Q. Yes. And so you relied upon Charlesworth's
statement that he was going to get that money
from Hill Field, didn't you A. Yes." (R. 215)
"Q. Then the same situation prevailed on the
$23,000.00 as prevailed on the $9,000.00 as to
Charlesworth's statement to you as to why
he needed an advance?
A. This is true.
Q. And you were still relying upon the fact that
he told you he was going to get payments
from the Hill Field job in order to pay you~
Is that right?
A. This is true, but this isn't - this isn't the
reason I gave him the money. The reason I
gave him this money was because Bob Dobbs
sent me this note telling me it was all right to
give it to him. Without that note, I wouldn't
have given him nothing." (R. 218-219)
The letter is Exhibit P. 10 in which Dobbs of Brunswick merely stated Brunswick would be willing to post-
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pon<> !'<'el•ipt of paymenh; from Jardine, and which was
deliv<•red ~with the \Yarning, ''protect yourself." The letter
in nn way indicates that Brunswick is recommending that
tlte money due it should he advanced to Charlesworth.
ft is simvly an agreement by Brunswick to postpone
n•(•(•ipt of a dO\vn payment. There is no evidence of
reliauee upon a representation by Bnmswick.

(h)

RIGHT TO RELY.

Plaintiff was a middle aged businessman who had
owned business properties and had operated various
enterprises including contractor for hauling, contractor
for cutting timber, owner and operator of sawmill employing 30 men, builder and owner of grocery store,
barber shop and cafe. All were profitable. (R. 120-124,
181) He had used lawyers in various business transactions but didn't on this one, (R. 165) yet he seeks to be
held harmless from results of his own poor business
judgment. He seeks to impose upon Brunswiok the duty
it would have if it were his guardian, merely because
Brunswick "recommended" a builder. A general recommendation is not actionable because it is a mere mattm·
of opinion.
"When the representation is made concerning something which is mere matter of opinion,
which every man can exercise his own judgment
upon and inquire about, it is the plaintiff's own
fault if he suffers himself to be deceived."

Stuck et. ·al. v. Delta Land & Water Co.,
63 U. 495, 227 P. 791, 795, 796.
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Brunswick's statement that Charlet:>worth wat:> a good
builder can't support an action in fraud or negligence.
A general statement re financial t:>tanding is not
actionable.
''A general statement or report stating conclusions as to the financial standing of a third
person which is made the basis of credit to him
is not generally actionable."
23 Am. J ur. Fraud and Deceit, p. 845, note 20.
See also, 32 ALR 2nd 209.
Here, there was no representation of fact.
Plaintiff may not rely upon statements where he has
equal means of discovery. He could have checked on the
builder himself and in fact did investigate the builder
by checking his current project at Hill Field, which was
the very project, the failure of which precipitated Jardine's loss. (R. 210, 250)
"The representations that the note was 'as
good as gold,' and that the investment company
would see that the plaintiff 'did not lose a penny,'
in and of themselves ; are matters of mere opinion,
exaggerated statements, and trade talk, and not
actionable. So far as made to appear, the plaintiff
and the investment company dealt at arm's length
with equal means of knowledge, dealing with each
other on equal terms and free from and uninfluenced by any fiduciary or trust relation ....
"Not anything is shown or made to appear,
is there any claim made, that the plai111tiff
had not equal means with the investment company
to find out the financial responsibility of the

~or
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\Vhik8, nor is it shown or made to appear or any
claim made that tlwre was anything with respect
to their financial responsibility or inability to pay
the note which was peculiarly within the knowledge of the investment company and not of the
plaintiff, or that any such matter was withheld
from the plaintiff by the company. It was shown
that about six months or more after the plaintiff
purchased the note, -White went into bankruptcy.
If when the plaintiff purchased the note -White
was then insolvent, not anything is made to appear
that the inve8tlnent company had knowledge of
such fact. 'l1he plaintiff testified she has no lmowledge of -White's delinquency until January, 1930,
when he surrendered his contract to the plaintiff
and 8he took possession of the property. We are
thus of the opinion that no actionable fraud may
be predicated on such claimed representations."

Ackerman v. Bramwell Inc. Co. et. al. 80 U.
52, 12 P. 2nd 623, 626.
"Under any standard of conduct, and in the
absence of accompanying actual deception, artifice, or misconduct, it is well agreed that where
the means of knowledge are at hand and are
equally available to both parties, and the subject
matter is equally open to their inspection, if one
of them does not avail himself of those means
and opportunities, he will not be heard to say
that he ·wa8 deceived by the other's misrepresentations."
23 Am. Jnr. Fraud and Deceit, Par. 155.
Here, plaintiff should have taken precautions a prudent investor ·would have taken before lending funds,
8Uch as check credit rating, and get security for the loan.
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A representation may be reli(•d upon only if a n·a::;onably prudent person under tlw circ-umstancei'.:l would havt•
done so.
"The essence of what fop plaintiff is S('eking
to accomplish is to have the defendant become in
effect a surety or guarantor of the debt of Mickelson, without the defondant having so agreed or
receiving anything for doing so. This would impose liability in the nature of a contractual obligation in the absence of the classic essentials: a
promise and a consideration. For this reason
it is resorted to only where circumstances are
such that equity and good conscience render its
application imperative in order to avoid an obvious unfairness and injustice. Further prerequisites to the interposition of such an estoppel are
the requirements that the promise or representation relied on must be sufficiently definite and
certain that the plaintiff acting as a reasonable
and prudent person under the circumstances
would be justified in placing reliance upon it:
and in case of uncertainty or doubt the responsibility is upon the plaintiff to ascertain the facts
before acting upon it."
Petty v. Gindy Manufactitring Corpomtion,

________ U. ________ , 404 P. 2d 30, 32.

The Petty case in which the plaintiff there was
represented by the same counsel as plaintiff Jardine
here, was an attempt, as in this case, to hold the onr
making a representation liable for damage suffered by
the plaintiff's relying thereon. Although the Petty theory
was promissory estoppel rather than J ardine's theory
of negligence, the factual situation is similar. In the
Petty case plaintiff made a loan to a third party, Mickel-
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:oon, who had assigned as security therefor commissions
to he paid by the defendant Gindy who manufactured
trailers sold by Mickelson as a dealer. Before making the
loan Petty inquired as to the amount of commissions
assignable as security. Gindy stated, "they have sufficient orders in or pending to more than cover this."
The conunissions turned out to be insufficient. The
Court stated that Gindy, who made the representation,
was not liable.
If plaintiff is aware misstatement is untrue, he may
not rely thereon.

"Later, and before the plaintiff had become
bound to convey and long before he had conveyed
his ranch away, he was informed in writing that
the annual income was $12,400. It is not claimed,
and there is no proof to show that the last statement was untrue. Thereafter the plaintiff wrote
that he was desirous of making the trade, and
later made it without any objection whatever that
the income of the apartments had been misrepresented....
"YV e agree with the trial court that the plaintiff failed to make out a case against either of
the defendants, and that the verdict was correctly
directed for all the defendants."

Baird v. Eflow Inc. Co. et. al. 76 U. 232, 289
P. 112, 114.
"But we also understand the rule to be that
if he became advised of the fraud perpetrated
upon him in season to recede from his engagement, and yet, with knowledge of the falsity of
the representations which had induced the con-
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tract, elects to perform, and clearly manif osts hi~
intention to abide by the contract, he condones the
fraud and is without remedy."

Hull v. Flinders, 83 U. 158, 27 P. :2d 5G, 58.
"Since the complaining party must rely on
representations in order to render them actionable, it follows that they must deceive him. In any
fraud case, in order to secure relief, the complaining party must, therefore, honestly confide in the
representations or, as has been said, must reasonably believe them to be true. The law will not
permit one to predicate damage upon statements
which he does not believe to be true, for if he
knows that they are false, it cannot truthfully be
said that he is deceived by them. This principle
is applicable however false and dishonest the representations may be, and regardless of the fact
that they are made with intent to deceive."
23 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit, Par. 1-±3.
Here the very fact that the builder needed to borrow
from plaintiff apprised plaintiff of the fact he was unable
to build the building.
(i)

PROXIMATE INJURY.

- Plaintiff's claimed injury resulted from a poor loan,
not from the builder's failure to complete a building and
lease it to plaintiff. When any statement was made regarding Compact, neither Jardine nor Brunswick contemplated that Jardine would be risking his own funds
by making a loan to Charlesworth. Therefore the damages claimed from the poor loan are remote.
Furthermore, if plaintiff is entitled to damages, it
is plaintiff's burden to prove the amount thereof, which
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he has not done. Plaintiff, when the building was partially completed, ordered the builder off the job and
demanded and received a conveyance of the property.
(Ex. P. 14-, R. 349) The value of the improved property
must be deducted from amounts expended therefor.

"For false representations concerning financial condition, recovery may be had for all damages sustained as a natural consequence of the
fraud, as where goods sold on false representations of the purchaser's solvency are not paid for
and the measure of the defrauded seller's damages
is the value of the goods with interest, or, if the
seller does receive partial payment for his property, the difference between the value of the
property and the value of the consideration received in exchange."
37 CJS. Fraud, Par. 142(C).
"Some cases hold that the measure of damages for fraudulent representations inducing a
sale on credit to a third person is the value of
the property at the time of the sale, less the
amount paid and the value of any security taken.
"The measure of damages for inducing a loan
to a third person by misrepresenting his financial
condition has been held to be the difference between the amount of the loan and the value of
the security given for the loan, if any, at the date
of the loan."
Annotation, 72 ALR 2d, 943, 944, 945.
There is no evidence as to its value, consequently
plaintiff has failed to establish the amount of his damages.
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POINT 2.
PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.

Jardine had as much opportunity as did Brnnswick
to check the assets, liabilities and net worth of Charlesworth, and of the subsequently incorporated Compaet
Buildings, the corporation with which Jardine ultimately
dealt.
A prudent investor before making a $23,000 loal!
would:
(a) Examine the borrower's financial statement.
(b) Get a credit report.
( c) Get adequate security even if the financial statement and report were favorable.
Plaintiff did none of these, yet looks to Brunswick as
a guarantor against losses he would have avoided under
usual good business practices.
Plaintiff argues that he did not require a financial
statement, as a prudent investor would have done, because he assumed Brunswick had done so, inasmuch as
Brunswick had required Jardine to furnish a financial
statement. The assumption is not justifiable, because the
relationships are not comparable. Brunswick was intending to extend credit to Jardine. Neither Brunswick nor
Jardine was intending to extend credit to the builder.
There was no credit risk involved with the builder until
Jardine decided to undertake the financing of the building himself. Only then did a financial statement becornP
material. Brunswick, until then, had no reason to require
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a financial statement bPcause neither it nor Jardine had
a credit risk. If anyone was neglectful in not examining
a financial statement when a loan was contemplated by
Jardine, it was he.
rrhe same is true of a credit report.
Hegardless of information disclosed by a financial
statement and credit report, a reasonably prudent person
would have required adequate security.
J ardine's most obvious contributory negligence,
however, is in closing his eyes to the obvious conclusion
that a builder, who is supposed to acquire a building site
and construct and pay for a building of this size who does
not initially have a $500 down payment for the land, and
who has no funds with which to even commence construction is not in the best of financial shape. The very fact
that the builder did not have funds, and couldn't get
them, apprises plaintiff of the fact that the builder could
not "build and finance the building," and that any statement made by Brunswick to that effect was no longer
true.
In a recent case this court said:
"Further than this, the pictures show that
the land was covered with rocks up to the size of
a man's head and it was so obviously rocky that
if the plaintiffs had taken the trouble to walk over
it, the most casual of inspections would have
shown that it was not good for cultivation. Parrish did nothing to actively prevent the Paces
from making an inspection and it would have been
little trouble to do so. Under those circumstances,
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\Ve believe that it must be• said as a matter of
law that the plaintiffs did not use rea~-;onable caru
and diligence. They were, thPrefon·, not t•ntitl('d
to rely on the representation and that item of
$1,750 in the judgment cannot be sustained."

Pace, et al v. Parrish, et al. 122 U. 14-1, 2-!-7
P. 2d 273, 275.
POINT 3.
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BECAUSE OF A RELEASE EXECUTED BY HIM.

The judgment in favor of Jardine in effect make::;
Brunswick the guarantor of the loan from plaintiff to
the builder. Before Brunswick should be held liablr·,
plaintiff should show that he has unsuccessfully demanded repayment from the borrower, Compact Buildings. The record shows no such demand, and in fact
shows the contrary, that plaintiff affirmatively released
Compact Buildings. (R. 226)
This release by Jardine of Compact Buildings and
Compact Buildings' release of any claim it had in the
property or against Jardine puts Jardine in this position:
He reaps the benefit of having his obligations to Compact
Buildings discharged, he acquires and takes away from
Compact Buildings an asset which af,fects Compact
Buildings' solvency and ability to cover any loss claimed
by Jardine, while at the same time Jardine saddles Brunswick with all responsibility for Compact Buildings' ultimate inability to perform.
The general rules of guarty set forth in the following
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paragraphs of 2± Arn. J ur. Guaranty would preclude a
n•covery here.
''7. Assurance, Recommendation, or Expression of Opinion. - A contract of guaranty is to be
distinguished from an expression of opinion that
a third per:-;on is trustworthy or reliable, from an
assurance that he will comply with contracts or
engagements, and from a representation that he
is solvent, reliable, or the like. A statement of this
character may not be relied on to establish contractual relations; nor may the writer of a letter
containing such assurances be held liable at the
suit of the addressee unless it is shown that, to
his knowledge, the observation or expression of
oipnion was false. The authorities recognize that
persons who are engaged in mercantile pursuits
commonly recommend correspondents one to
another without intending to become guarantors
of the persons recommended."
"87. Release of Principal Debtor; Discharge
by Operation of Law. - Generally speaking, the
guarantor is held to have been released or discharged of liability where it appears that, by
reason of some act or omission on the part of the
creditor, the principal debtor has become discharged of his obligation without satisfaction
thereof."
"108. Generally; Pursuit of Remedy by
Creditor. - In some situations, at any rate, the
creditor or obligee, prior to bringing action to
recover on the contract of guaranty, is bound to
take measures for the collection of the debt from
the principal debtor, liability on the part of the
guarantor being conditioned upon the exercise of
diligence to promote payment by the debtor. The
creditor must, unless the guaranty is absolute, de-
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mand payment of the debtor and give notice of
default to the guarantor; and if he fails to do so,
he may be barred of recovery.

,;)

" ... the guaranty is held to be conditional
requiring the creditor to proceed against tlu'.
debtor, where the contract purports to assun• or
secure the creditor, where the guarantor hws
agreed to indeminfy the creditor against loss, or
where he has guaranteed the 'ultimate payment'
of the debt or the 'collection' of the amount then·of."

The primary obligation to plaintiff was the builder\;,
to build and repay the loan, but the judgment against
Brunswick makes it a coobligor. Under 15-4-4 and 15-4-3
UCA 1953 the release of the builder, without a reservation of rights against Brunswick was a release of Brunswick.
"15-4-1. In this chapter ... 'obligation includes a liability in tort. . . . "
"15-4-4. RELEASE OF CO-OBLIGOR RESERVATION OF RIGHTS. - Subject to the
provisions of section 15-4-3. the obligee's release
or discharge of one or more of several obligors,
or of one or more of joint or of joint and several
obligors, shall not discharge, co-obligors against
whom the obligee in writing and as as part of the
same transaction as the release or discharge expressly reserves his rights; and in the absence of
such a reservation of rights shall discharge coobligors only to the extent provided in section
15-4-5."
"15-4-5. RELEASE OF CO-OBLIGOR EFFECT OF KNO"\VLEDGE OF OBLIGEE. -
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If an obligee releasing or discharging an obligor
without ex1H'ess reservation of rights against a
co-obligor then knows or has reason to know that
the obligor released or discharged did not pay as
much of the claim as he was bound by his contract or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the
obligee's claim against that co-obligor shall be
satisfied to the amount which the obligee knew
or had reason to know that the released or discharged obligor was hound to such co-obligor to
pay.
"If an obligee so releasing or discharging an
obligor has not then such knowledge or reason to
know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor
shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two
amounts, namely: (a) the amount of the fractional
share of the obligor released or discharged, or (b)
the amount that such obligor was bound by his
his contract or relation with the co-obligor to pay."
POINT 4.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW DO NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD, AND THE
JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

The findings and conclusions ignore the points raised
above and the judgment based thereon is therefore contrary to law.

CONOLUSION
Brunswick's motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case should have been granted. The judgment
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY

JOHN W. LOWE

